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Cascades of Coverage
Cascades of Coverage: Dynamics of Media Attention 
to Social Movement Organizations
Charles Seguin, University of North Carolina
Gaining attention in the mass media is a key goal of many social movement organ-izations (SMOs). The dominant explanation of media attention to SMOs is that the media act like a filter, selecting some types of SMOs and events for attention, and 
ignoring others based on characteristics of these SMOs, events, and their political envi-
ronment. In contrast to this “bias model,” I argue that some media attention to SMOs is 
characterized by positive feedback, or rich-get-richer processes: past media attention 
increases the likelihood of future media attention through its effect on the SMO and on 
other media outlets. Like other positive feedback systems, media attention can be path 
dependent, is routinely punctuated by large cascades of attention to previously obscure 
SMOs, and can be contingent on “accidents” of history: at critical junctures, individu-
als, organizations, and events have the potential to radically impact the extent of media 
attention to their movements and organizations. Media attention to SMOs can also 
become decoupled from the types of events that initially sparked their media attention, 
becoming spokes-organizations for their movements and receiving media attention for 
events and stories that they themselves are not involved. In support of this theory, I first 
show that media attention is, similar to other positive feedback processes, power-law 
distributed across SMOs using two national (US) data sets. I then illustrate the process 
of positive feedback in media attention through a case study of the Black Panther 
 Party’s rise to prominence in media attention.
In democratic countries with independent news media, a key goal of social move-
ment organizations (SMOs) is to gain attention, or visibility, in the mass media. 
The dominant explanation for media attention to SMOs is that the media pay 
differential attention to SMOs based on biased interpretations of which events, 
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messages, and organizations they consider newsworthy. Bias thus acts like a filter, 
selecting some types of SMOs and events for attention while ignoring others. 
Understanding this media bias has been central for both methodological and sub-
stantive reasons in the study of social movements (e.g., Myers and Caniglia 2004; 
Oliver and Myers 1999). Movement scholars have shown that the news media 
pays more attention to larger, more disruptive SMOs with more elite allies, more 
resonant issue framing, and greater policy influence (e.g., Amenta et al. 2009; 
Andrews and Caren 2010). The bias model thus suggests that media attention is a 
distorted reflection of the properties of SMOs and their political environments.
Other movement scholarship suggests that the bias model is incomplete, since 
media attention has effects on movements and SMOs. Programmatic theoretical 
work argues that media and movements are “interacting” or “coevolving” sys-
tems (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Koopmans 2004; Oliver and Myers 2003). 
These scholars argue that while media representations of movements are shaped 
by media biases, media attention, and its pursuit, also shapes movements. Media 
attention, for instance, helps SMOs grow their membership, attract elite allies, 
and influence political and cultural outcomes (e.g., Vliegenthart, Oegema, and 
Klandermans 2005). Media scholars also note that media attention often occurs 
in cascades, largely as a result of media outlets imitating one another in chasing 
“hot” new stories to deliver to audiences in the context of a competitive capitalist 
system1 (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Boydstun 2013; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 
2010). These internal media dynamics have largely been ignored in studies’ media 
attention to SMOs (although see for example Amenta et al. 2012; Gamson 2004).
While the bias model ignores these interactions, they have consequences for 
understanding how and why some SMOs garner more media attention than oth-
ers. I argue that some media attention to SMOs is characterized by positive feed-
back, or rich-get-richer processes. This suggests that, like other positive feedback 
systems, media attention is path dependent and routinely punctuated by large 
cascades of attention to previously obscure SMOs. Media attention can therefore 
be contingent on “accidents” of history: at critical junctures, individuals, organi-
zations, and events have the potential to radically impact the extent of media 
representation of their movements (Sewell 1996). These dynamics may help 
explain why, despite the centrality of media attention to SMO efforts, most SMOs 
receive little to no coverage (Sobieraj 2011). These dynamics may also help 
explain why, at times, even small organizations explode unpredictably into the 
media spotlight, garnering orders of magnitude more attention than their peers.
Similar to other path-dependent phenomena, media attention to SMOs can 
become decoupled from the types of events that sparked the attention in the first 
place. As they become embedded in a news story, SMOs can become spokes-
organizations for their movements and receive media attention for events and 
stories in which they themselves are not involved (Gamson 2004). This decou-
pling can make media attention to SMOs disproportional to their resources, 
activities, and political impacts.
Because accidents of history can have enduring consequences in positive feed-
back systems, these models offer “strong explanatory power but little predictive 
power” (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 307; see also Boydstun 2013). Therefore, 
I do not attempt to predict which specific SMOs will receive more attention than 
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others, but rather to show that positive feedback can explain key facts about the 
distribution and dynamics of attention to some SMOs. I first show that, like other 
positive feedback systems (Biggs 2005; van de Rijt et al. 2013; Simon 1955), 
media attention to SMOs is power-law distributed in two data sets describing 
counts of television newscasts and newspaper articles mentioning US SMOs. 
I then describe a case study of the rise in media attention of the Black Panther 
Party, one of the largest and most dramatic media cascades to an SMO in US his-
tory, showing that the Panthers used their early attention to spark a positive 
feedback process.
Media Bias and Social Movement Organizations
The dominant model of media and social movements suggests that media acts as 
a kind of filter that takes information from the world and translates it into news. 
Journalists, editors, and news organizations act as gatekeepers that select orga-
nizations and events from the larger world for news coverage according to their 
resonance with new values (Earl et al. 2004; Galtung and Ruge 1965). Within 
this “bias model,” media attention to SMOs is a function of the characteristics 
of SMOs and their political environments, which are (generally implicitly) 
assumed to be independent of prior media attention (e.g., Andrews and Caren 
2010).
Movement scholars have pointed to four primary aspects of SMOs and their 
political environments that affect media attention: the scope of conflict, resources, 
frames, and tactics. The “scope of conflict” refers to the extent to which other 
political actors, including elite allies and opponents, the state, counter- movements, 
and crowds, have been drawn into the movement’s fight (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
1993). These other actors, particularly the state and other elites, draw routine 
media attention, and SMOs who draw them into the fight are likely to receive 
more media attention. The media prefer to cover large, important actors, and 
thus SMOs with more resources tend to receive more attention. SMOs are more 
likely to receive media attention when they frame their messages in ways that 
resonate with the attention cycle, or issues currently prominent in the news media 
(Andrews and Caren 2010; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996). Disruptive 
tactics, such as protests that draw arrests, resonate with news values and have 
been a common path to media attention (e.g., Gitlin 1980), although disruption 
falls far short of a sufficient condition for media attention (Sobieraj 2011).
Media and SMOs as Interacting Systems
The bias model continues to motivate empirical work, but it is limited. Social 
movement theory has stressed that the media and movements interact in key 
ways. Media bias works to shape reporting of movements, but media attention 
also affects movements and SMOs. This means that media attention to SMOs is 
part of a dynamic process in which media representations are both causes and 
consequences of SMO characteristics. Moreover, dynamic processes—primarily 
capitalist and professional competition for  audiences—occur across news outlets 
and between journalists, which shapes media attention over time.
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On a national level, actors not already central to a political conflict are likely 
to get their information about an SMO through the news media. Media attention 
to SMOs is therefore largely necessary to draw them into the SMO’s fight, expand 
the scope of conflict, mobilize SMO constituencies, draw crowds, and attract 
counter-movements (Gamson 2004; Koopmans 2004; Meyer and Staggenborg 
1996, 1642; Oliver and Myers 1999). Perhaps most importantly, movement 
scholars have argued that media attention may be necessary for movements to 
influence state agendas (Koopmans 2004).
Media attention also tends to increase an SMO’s resources by serving as “free 
advertising”—helping SMOs reach constituents, sympathizers, and broader pub-
lics (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans 2005). 
Thus, even as other resources and actors draw media attention to an SMO, media 
attention tends also to bring new actors into the SMO fight—whether as allies or 
opponents—and thus to attract still more media attention.
Movements and SMOs tend to base their tactics in part on what has attracted 
media attention in the past (Sobieraj 2011). Koopmans and Olzak (2004), for 
instance, show that, in an extreme right-wing German movement, a tactic of 
attacking asylum seekers was initially resonant in the media, leading the move-
ment to emphasize this tactic above others and to the movement becoming 
framed as primarily anti-asylum seekers. Bail (2012) shows that, as organizations 
employing “Muslims as enemies” frames gained success in the media, they drew 
similar organizations into employing the frame while increasing their centrality 
to the larger organizational field. Adaptation to media attention need not neces-
sarily be the result of conscious and strategic decisions by organizations. Rather, 
media attention to certain tactics and frames is likely to attract new recruits with 
preference for those same frames and tactics (Gitlin 1980; Koopmans and Olzak 
2004). Media attention is thus an occasion for SMOs to discover, and accentuate, 
resonant tactics and frames, which in turn are likely to attract more attention.
Media Attention Cascades
In capitalist systems, journalists and news outlets are in competition for both 
audiences and advertisers. The American context is unique even among Western 
countries in its low level of public subsidy for news media (Brüggemann et al. 
2014). Capitalism shapes news content in many ways; critically for the argument 
here, competition among news outlets means that news outlets are afraid of not 
carrying “hot” stories that other outlets are carrying for fear of losing readers or 
viewers (Boydstun 2013). Thus, when a story or issue is highly covered in one 
news outlet, it is very likely to be highly covered in other outlets (Atkinson, 
Lovett, and Baumgartner 2014; Gorman and Seguin Forthcoming, 7–8; Hilgart-
ner and Bosk 1988). While different news outlets generally pay attention to the 
same things, they often frame things according to ideological differences (Snow, 
Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown 2007). Thus, news outlets respond to one 
another’s news with counter-framings that contest their ideological opponents’ 
understanding of issues. A positive or negative article about an SMO in one 
media outlet may therefore elicit increased attention in other ideologically dis-
similar outlets as they attempt to counter-frame the SMO.
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Journalists also deliberately structure media attention to an issue or actor into 
“stories” or connected narratives—past news stories are causal in guiding selec-
tion criteria for future stories, with an eye toward thematic continuity. Thus, once 
an event or entity becomes defined as news, it will continue to be defined as news 
even if much of what made it of initial interest is gone (Fishman 1978; Galtung 
and Ruge 1965; Koopmans and Vliegenthart 2011). These sorts of dynamics can 
underlie moral panics, such as the construction of “crime waves” as one type of 
crime becomes a news story, and these events are then disproportionately reported 
(Fishman 1978; Hall 1978, 71–72). As a result of these dynamics, media atten-
tion is rarely proportionate to events in the world, but rather switches between 
dramatic under-attention and over-attention (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; 
Boydstun 2013).
SMOs that receive a fair amount of media attention are likewise embedded in 
stories (Amenta et al. 2012). These SMOs enjoy what Gamson and Wolfsfeld call 
“standing”—defined as the extent to which journalists take a movement actor 
seriously (1993). Standing is not an objective quantity that is simply observed by 
journalists. Rather, since journalists operate in an uncertain environment, they 
often look to what other journalists have already covered to determine, and con-
struct, the standing of a movement actor (Gamson 2004). When SMOs enjoy 
standing, they can be covered as spokes-organizations for movements—receiving 
attention for actions they did not initiate (Amenta et al. 2012; Gamson 2004). 
Thus, as SMOs become institutionalized as spokes-organizations, their media 
attention becomes increasingly decoupled from the kinds of dramatic events that 
may have originally gotten them into the spotlight.
Positive Feedback
The relationships identified above form a positive feedback process: media atten-
tion tends to increase the same variables that increase media attention, whether 
they be the scope of conflict, organization resources, frames, tactics, or the extent 
to which an SMO is embedded in an ongoing news story. Through these mecha-
nisms, past media attention exerts a positive causal effect on present and future 
media coverage. Figure 1 illustrates the argument. It should be noted that these 
mechanisms are probabilistic: past media attention only makes future media 
attention, a generally rare event, more likely than it would have otherwise been. 
These virtuous cycles therefore do not go on forever, but eventually die out—
indeed, most news cascades end quickly.
Contingent historical events have enduring impacts in positive feedback pro-
cesses, making the identification of positive feedback difficult since the impact of 
“errors,” or small events, does not wash out with increasing observations (Arthur, 
Ermoliev, and Kaniovski 1987). Bi-directional causal relationships between the 
dependent and “independent” variables are also endemic to positive feedback 
processes. Scholars thus do not recommend regression methodologies for the 
study of positive feedback processes (see, e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 
307–10; Biggs 2005, 1687); meaning that we must consider novel methods to 
analyze positive feedback. Both empirical and theoretical work shows that 
inequality generated by positive feedback takes the form of a power-law 
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 distribution, a type of highly skewed distribution2 (e.g., Biggs 2005; Newman 
2005; Simon 1955; van de Rijt et al. 2013). Following the lead of these scholars, 
I evaluate the positive feedback model by testing the implication that the sizes of 
cascades of attention to SMOs are power-law distributed. I then discuss the Black 
Panthers case study.
Distributional Analysis
I test for power-law distributions in two data sets. The first data set contains 
counts of 298,359 New York Times articles mentioning 1,247 unique US SMOs 
over the entire twentieth century gathered by an electronic search by Amenta 
et al. (2009). The second data set contains counts of SMO mentions from the 
abstracts of the Vanderbilt Television News Archives. The abstracts are descrip-
tions of evening news stories that aired on the major television networks (NBC, 
ABC, CBS) from fall 1968 to 2009. This data set was generated by an electronic 
search for the SMO names used in Amenta et al (2009) and contains 15,858 sto-
ries mentioning 395 distinct SMOs. SMOs were selected for inclusion in these 
data sets according to definitions of SMOs given by McCarthy and Zald (1977) 
and Gamson (1975), which conceptualize SMOs as formal organizations tied to 
the goals of social movements, or seeking to mobilize new constituencies against 
targets within government. These data include only SMOs with national political 
goals (for more detail, see Amenta et al. 2009, 639–40). Local SMOs and media 
are outside the scope of the theory, because local SMOs have more face-to-face 
Figure 1. Positive feedback in media attention to SMOs
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relationships with constituents, and because of the more limited competition 
between local media outlets.
In both data sets, I measure counts of articles or newscasts mentioning specific 
organizations. While counts are only a rough measure of media attention, they 
tend to be highly correlated with more sophisticated measures of attention. The 
correlation between counts of front-page and other articles for the 30 most cov-
ered SMOs in the New York Times is .97 (Amenta et al. 2009). Andrews and 
Caren find that using a more sophisticated measure of attention, including length 
of articles, placement, and the presence or absence of photos, does not change 
their results; the correlation between this measure and the raw counts is .95 
(2010).
I take the size of cascades of media coverage, or continuous periods of high 
media attention, to SMOs as the unit of analysis. Some analysts, following 
practices in the epidemiology literature, separate cascades from one another 
by periods where there are no events of interest (Biggs 2005, 1696). This 
strategy is not appropriate for media attention to SMOs, as they often have 
periods of low coverage between clearly distinct cascades. Further, even rela-
tively rapid rises in media attention, such as those to the Black Panthers and 
the Students for a Democratic Society, unfold over a period of years—short 
periods of inattention do not necessarily indicate a substantive break in the 
cascade. For these reasons, as well as a substantive interest in larger cascades, 
I define cascades as consecutive periods of high attention to an SMO. For the 
New York Times, I operationalized the duration of cascades of coverage to 
SMOs as consecutive years where a group received at least fifty articles. 
Reflecting the much smaller news hole for movements in television news, I set 
the cutoff at five stories. This method identified 441 cascades in the New York 
Times and 153 in the television data. Figure 2 illustrates this cascade mea-
surement strategy on some key SMOs in the New York Times. The SMOs in 
figure 2 were chosen to give readers a sense of the scale and dynamics of 
media cascades on some familiar SMOs. I then counted the number of stories 
or articles in each cascade, and analyzed the size distribution of these cas-
cades. Any cutoff is necessarily somewhat arbitrary; those that are too large 
will miss smaller cascades, while those that are too small will aggregate dis-
tinct cascades. I therefore conducted extensive robustness checks with a wide 
range of cutoffs (including zero); the results are remarkably robust to alterna-
tive specifications. Comparing the two data sets where they overlap in time 
(1968–2009) shows substantial similarity. The correlation coefficient between 
organization-year newscasts and Times articles is .6. Only one organization 
receives more than ten newscasts without also having a cascade in the Times 
data. Thus, high attention in television only very rarely occurs without sub-
stantial attention in the Times as well—likely owing to the larger news hole 
for print media.
Power-Law Analysis
The distribution of media coverage to SMOs is highly skewed in both the 
New York Times and the television news data sets—most SMOs receive very 
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little attention, while a few receive most of their movement’s attention. The 
Gini coefficient measure for inequality in story counts across SMOs is .88 in 
the Times and .82 in the television data. For comparison, the Gini coefficient 
for the US wealth distribution in 2008 was .80 (Davies et al. 2009). This 
 dramatic skew means that 86 and 82 percent of organizations in the data 
are below the mean count of stories in the New York Times and television 
data, respectively—that is, over 80 percent are “below average” in media 
 representation.
A power-law distribution is one type of skewed distribution, in which the 
probability density function (pdf) is defined as follows:
 f x ax( ) .=
−α
 
It is rare to find power-laws across the entire range of the data; generally, 
power-laws are found only in the right tail (although in many cases the “tail” 
encompasses most of the distribution) (Newman 2005). I estimated power-laws 
for the right tails of the distributions of media coverage in the two data sets via 
maximum likelihood (Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009). Figures 3 and 4 
below show the power-law fit to the right tails of the observed data on log-log 
plots.3 These plots show a good fit to the right tails for the New York Times and 
the television news data.
Figure 2. Cascades measurement strategy
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Note: The figure illustrates the measurement of news cascades. Cascades occur in years above 
the article count cutoff. The size of cascades is the total number of articles in all consecutive 
years above the cutoff. There are 411 cascades identified in the New York Times data. These 
cases were chosen to show how the cascades measurement works in a variety of conditions, 
as well as to provide context for the Black Panthers’ media cascade with the media attention of 
some well-known SMOs.
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Even when the power-law is a statistically good fit to some data, the log- normal 
distribution is often a significantly better fit (Clauset, Shalizi, and  Newman 2009). 
I used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the fit of the power-law to the data, and a 
log-likelihood ratio test to compare the power-law fit to that of the best-fitting 
log-normal distribution (Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009). Table 1  displays 
p-values of the null hypothesis for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of a power-law 
distribution, estimates for the scaling parameter (α) for the best-fit power-law, and 
p-values of likelihood ratio tests against the log-normal distribution. The estimates 
show that in both cases the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of power-law. The table also shows that likelihood ratio tests do not 
reject the power-law in favor of the log-normal. Taken together, these results sug-
gest that power-law distributions are good fits to these data.
Power-law distributions suggest positive feedback; however, they say little 
about how such a process might work (see, e.g., Newman 1996). Like all quanti-
tative results, power-laws must be interpreted in light of both theory and qualita-
tive understandings of the phenomena. In principle, the power-law distribution 
in media attention shown here could reflect some positive feedback process that 
occurs independently from the media. Below, I illustrate the positive feedback 
process in the cascade of attention to the Black Panthers.
Figure 3. Power-law distribution fit of media attention in the New York Times (1900–2000)
Cascade Size (# of Articles)
Empirical Data
Power-Law Fit
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X
≥
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100
Note: The figure illustrates the size distribution of news cascades; that is, the total number of 
news articles mentioning an SMO during a period of high media attention, and the power-law fit 
to that distribution. N = 411 news cascades to 151 unique organizations.
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The Black Panthers’ Avalanche of Attention
The Black Panthers News Cascade
Black power emerged as a broad social movement beginning in 1966 and 
extended through the 1970s. Early calls for black power emerged in the southern 
civil rights struggle (Jeffries 2009; Tyson 1999), but the movement quickly spread 
and took strongest root in major cities outside the South. Recent years have seen 
a surge of historical interest in the Black Power movement. Among the key puz-
zles of the period is that the Black Power movement included innumerable orga-
nizations and leaders (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Joseph 2010), yet the Black 
Panther Party came to nearly entirely dominate the media attention to the move-
ment, becoming the “privileged signifier of Black militancy” (Singh 1998, 61). 
This pattern, of a small group exploding from obscurity to dominate the  attention 
Figure 4. Power-law distribution fit of media attention in television news (1969–2009)
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Power-Law Fit
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Note: The figure illustrates the size distribution of news cascades; that is, the total number of 
news broadcasts mentioning an SMO during a period of high media attention, and the power-
law fit to that distribution. N = 153 news cascades to 65 unique organizations.
Table 1. Power-Law Test and Fit Statistics
Data P reject power-law P reject for log-normal Alpha Range
New York Times 0.256 0.553 1.81 104–60,277
Television 0.535 0.731 2.12 35–1,291
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of their movement, makes the Panthers an ideal case for studying positive feed-
back. Figure 5 below shows the news cascade to the Black Panthers in three 
major national newspapers: the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and New 
York Times.4 The Panthers national news cascade, as figure 5 demonstrates, 
began in 1967 and was largely finished by 1974, although they continued to 
receive low levels of coverage for many years, even up to the present day (Rhodes 
2007).
To analyze the Panthers cascade, I used activist memoirs, secondary historical 
accounts, the population of New York Times articles mentioning the Black Pan-
thers from 1967 to 1969 (965 articles), and other newspaper sources from the 
period to construct an event catalogue. I briefly compare the Panthers’ media 
attention to that of other Black Power organizations of the time, and then move 
to a within-case comparison of the Panthers over time.
Table 2 shows the total articles that the New York Times ran mentioning the 
most prominent Black Power groups from 1967 to 1977. The table demonstrates 
that the Panthers dominated attention to Black Power organizations over the 
period. Even the fairly high amount of attention to the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) is concentrated in 1967, before the Panthers 
began receiving high levels of attention. There is no obvious exogenous difference 
between these groups that accounts for their radically divergent levels of atten-
tion, as we would expect from a bias model. Although the Panthers did eventually 
come to have more resources than these groups, as I discuss later on, the Panthers 
resources were both a cause and an effect of their media attention, making 
resources an inadequate explanation. The Panthers’ dramatic armed self-defense 
tactics are another possible explanation. However, other groups had similarly 
Figure 5. Black Panthers’ cascade of media attention, 1967–1978
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Note: The figure above gives monthly counts of articles mentioning the Black Panthers in three 
national papers, the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and New York Times.
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newsworthy tactics. Tactics of the Republic of New Africa included “robberies, 
shootouts with police, plots to bomb state and federal buildings, and even a plane 
hijacking” (Davenport 2005, 127). J. Edgar Hoover was quoted in the New York 
Times testifying before Congress that the Revolutionary Action Movement 
(RAM) was “dedicated to the overthrow of the capitalist system in the United 
States, by violence if necessary.” Other Times articles detailed mass arrests of 
RAM members, with confiscations of weapons such as machine guns, and argued 
that RAM was building an “Army for Ghettoes.” I include more detail on RAM 
in an online appendix (see the supplementary material online) to this article. 
Members of the US organization were responsible for shootings of Panther lead-
ers. While there were differences between these groups and the Panthers, these 
differences are insufficient to explain the roughly 50 to 70 times the amount of 
media attention the Panthers received.
Early History
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale founded the Black Panther Party for Self Defense 
(BPP)5 in Oakland, California, in October 1966. Inspired by the Black Panther 
Party of Lowndes County, Alabama, part of a drive to register Black voters by the 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Oakland Panthers borrowed 
the Panthers name and much of their iconography. The Oakland Panthers were 
nevertheless a wholly different and independent organization. Newton took the 
title of Minister of Defense, while Seale took the title of Party Chairman. Because 
the Panthers were at war with the white power structure, the Minister of Defense 
was the highest-ranking position (Seale 1991, 59–69). Seale and Newton origi-
nally belonged to a front group for the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM). 
Seale was a full-fledged RAM member, but Newton had been denied full member-
ship for being “too bourgeois” (Ogbar 2004, 84; Seale 1991). Before founding the 
BPP, Newton and Seale had attempted to convince RAM to start armed neighbor-
hood patrols to monitor the police and attract the press. RAM members consid-
ered the move “suicidal” (Austin 2006, 32–33). Following this rebuff, Newton and 
Seale organized the BPP around their ten-point program, heavily influenced by 
RAM ideology (Ogbar 2004, 81); the program stressed the need for black political 
autonomy as well as the necessity of ending police brutality (Seale 1991, 66–68).
The Panthers’ organization structure was a nested hierarchy, which was later 
replicated in state and local branches. The Minister of Defense and the Chairman 
Table 2. Media Attention to Black Power Organizations (1967–1977)
Black Power organizations
Total NYT articles
(1967–1977)
Black Panthers 3019
Republic of New Afrika 61
Revolutionary Action Movement 47
SNCC 445
US Organization 44
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were on top, after which the hierarchy branched out to Field Marshall, Minister 
of Culture, and Communications Secretary. Beneath the Minister of Culture were 
Lieutenants, Captains, and Officers of the Day, with the Rank-and-File forming 
the bottom of the pyramid (Austin 2006, 37–39). Recruitment took place through 
BPP offices, and members began at the Rank-and-File.
Tactics
Early Panther activities focused on armed neighborhood patrols of Oakland, 
which they adapted from similar, although unarmed, patrols in the Watts neigh-
borhood of LA (Austin 2006; Bloom and Martin 2013, 39). Panthers sought to 
demonstrate that Blacks could obtain protection from corrupt police by organiz-
ing (Newton and Blake 2009, 127–35). Armed Panthers would follow police 
patrol cars, observe any stops or arrests made, and inform those arrested of their 
rights. If someone was arrested on the Panthers’ watch, they would try to raise 
money for bail (Austin 2006, 53–56). These tactics led to highly charged, armed, 
standoffs between Panthers and police, but did not generate national media 
attention.
A new tactic brought the Panthers their first national media attention. On May 2, 
1967, thirty Black Panthers, most of them openly carrying arms, gathered in Sac-
ramento at the California State Legislature in protest of a proposed gun-control 
bill that would restrict openly carrying weapons. During the protest, the Panthers 
were forced out of the building by capital guards in full view of a surprised press 
corps (Wendt 2007, 172–73). The story figured prominently in the Bay Area 
press, as well as the national elite media (Bloom and Martin 2013, 61; Rhodes 
2007, 70). The ultimate importance of this tactical innovation, however, was in 
initiating a positive feedback process, through which the Panthers eventually rose 
to become a national organization and a national media phenomenon, as I  discuss 
below.
Resources
While the Sacramento protest was widely covered in the national media, its ulti-
mate importance was in setting into motion a positive feedback process that only 
much later brought the Panthers to the center of national media attention. After 
the Sacramento protest, the Panthers were swamped with requests from all over 
the Bay Area and the rest of the country from activists interested in establishing 
their own Panther chapters (Austin 2006, 78; Bloom and Martin 2013, 61–62; 
Rhodes 2007, 70–80). Images of Sacramento would follow the Panthers every-
where—when the Panthers began to set up a chapter in Harlem, for instance, 
media images of Sacramento had already swayed some potential members 
(Bloom and Martin 2013, 152). Newton would later write:
Sacramento was certainly a success … in attracting national attention; 
even those who did not hear the complete message saw the arms, and this 
conveyed enough to Black people. The Bay Area became more aware of 
the Party, and soon we had more members than we could handle. From 
all across the country calls came to us about establishing chapters and 
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branches; we could hardly keep track of the requests. In a matter of 
months we went from a small Bay Area group to a national organization. 
(Newton and Blake 2009 [1973], 159)
If the publicity from the Sacramento protest had attracted resources to the Pan-
thers, in the form of greater local support and the founding of chapters nation-
wide, these same resources later increased the Panthers’ media profile. As the rise 
in attention shown in figure 5 demonstrates, the Panthers were a national media 
phenomenon; attention rose and fell with similar timing and magnitude in all 
three papers. Yet, the similarities in the rise and fall of the Panthers’ profile in 
these outlets mask the heterogeneity in the coverage itself, which was influenced 
heavily by local Panthers’ events and chapters—consistent with a large body of 
scholarship showing that media outlets tend to cover closer events with higher 
probability than those farther away (e.g., Davenport 2010). The Los Angeles 
Times covered local college protests, such as those at San Francisco State, which 
the Panthers were involved in. The assassination of the Chicago Panthers leader, 
Fred Hampton, in December 1969 can be seen in figure 5 in the massive spike in 
attention in the Chicago Tribune. The New York Times coverage emphasized 
local police-Panther conflicts. The Panthers were thus a national media phenom-
enon partly because they had become a national organization. To summarize: 
early, limited, attention in the national media helped recruit and strengthen local 
Panthers chapters, while these local groups later contributed to creating nation-
wide news attention. Contrary to the bias model, resources were just as much a 
consequence as a cause of attention.
Story Dynamics
The Sacramento protest also drew the Panthers into an ongoing story, introduc-
ing audiences to the organization and its leadership. Following Sacramento, the 
New York Times ran two lengthy articles on the personalities and biographies of 
Panthers leaders. The first article, “A Gun Is Power, Black Panther Says,” dis-
cussed Newton’s biography, and painted Newton as the violent personality at the 
head of an armed revolutionary organization. These, and similar articles, set the 
Panthers up as a threat to white society, setting the stage for alarmist coverage of 
the Panthers, as in a moral panic (Rhodes 2007, 71–82).
The second article since Sacramento, “Call of the Panthers,” was a lengthy 
feature written in the Times Sunday magazine on August 6 by New Left writer 
Sol Stern. This article discussed the Panthers’ organization, ideology, and history 
over six pages. The article gave the Panthers their preferred framing, painting the 
Panthers as the spokes-organization for Black urban discontent. The article went 
into depth on the personalities of Newton and Seale and featured photographs, 
including a large photo of Huey Newton that had originally appeared in the Pan-
thers’ own media (Bloom and Martin 2013, 80), seated in a chair with a rifle in 
one hand and a spear in the other. The iconic photo of Newton would go on to 
appear in other papers, such as the Los Angeles Times. The article introduced 
Newton as willing to commit “revolutionary suicide”: to kill police in self-defense 
and to die if necessary when the time came. While the article was generally 
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 supportive of the Panthers, the article also characterized them as “pitifully small 
in numbers,” with “meager” organizational resources, and lacking widespread 
support in the Black community. The article closed thus: “The fate of the Panthers 
as an organization is not the issue. What matters is that there are a thousand 
black people in the ghetto thinking privately what any Panther says out loud.” 
These early articles on Newton and his personality were significant in establish-
ing Newton as a media personality and setting the stage for a media frenzy at his 
later trial (Rhodes 2007, 83–84).
Following Sacramento, the Panthers were continuing to experience consider-
able repression, and on October 29 the New York Times ran a short article enti-
tled “Patrolman Killed in Coast Gunfight,” which detailed a shootout in which 
Huey Newton and an Oakland police officer were injured, and another, Officer 
John Frey,6 was killed. While the Frey shooting was given only four paragraphs 
of newsprint in the New York Times, and the Panthers would not be mentioned 
in the Times for another four months, Newton’s subsequent murder trial marks 
the beginning of sustained high levels of attention to the Panthers.
Over time the Panthers became more established news commodities: the media 
began to cover less dramatic Panthers’ events, as well as give the Panthers atten-
tion for events that they did not initiate—similar to other highly covered SMOs 
(Amenta et al. 2012). The Panthers were mentioned in 488 different New York 
Times articles in 1969. The content of these articles demonstrate the Panthers’ 
new status as a media institution. Many articles covered trivial events or subjects: 
an article in September about a march put on by over 150 different organizations 
spends considerable newsprint on the estimated thirty-five Panthers present; an 
April article reports an airport car theft, in which one of the theives allegedly had 
a Panthers membership card—the story was more about the membership card 
than the car theft; in January, an article discussed the police stopping Panthers 
leader Kathleen Cleaver on a bridge to ask her some questions.7 Other articles 
linked the Panthers to events they did not cause—such as urban riots or racial 
tension among soldiers in Vietnam—in effect making the Panthers the organiza-
tional voice of the larger Black Power movement, as well as a symptom or leading 
edge of a generalized racial threat. Thus, the media began searching for “Panthers 
stories” wherever they could find them. Contrary to the bias model, increasing 
was not driven solely by exogenous changes in the Panthers organization, events, 
and political environment, but also by the Panthers becoming instutionalized as 
an ongoing news story.
To make a more formal test of the hypothesis that the Panthers were receiving 
greater attention for fewer events, I coupled the total yearly articles in the New 
York Times to the Panthers with the Collective Action Dataset (see, e.g., Earl, 
Soule, and McCarthy 2003). The Collective Action Dataset contains stories, 
coded from an exhaustive search of the New York Times, that mention any col-
lective action event. The data set also contains information about when a social 
movement organization participated in that collective action. From the Collective 
Action Dataset I took the yearly number of events that the Panthers were coded 
as having taken part in, and compared this to the yearly number of New York 
Times articles that mentioned the Panthers for any reason. Figure 6 below dis-
plays both these quantities over time. Events track closely with media coverage at 
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around a 1/25 ratio until 1970–1971, when event counts begin to decline more 
rapidly than do article counts. Figure 7 below shows the total number of New 
York Times articles about collective action events the Panthers took part in, 
divided by the total number of New York Times articles mentioning the Panthers. 
The figure shows that the percentage of articles referencing an event, which was 
never large, declines steadily throughout this period as the Panthers became their 
own national story. The time trend is statistically signifcant (p < .01). While it is 
hard, perhaps even impossible (Davenport 2010), to know what percentage of 
the events that Panthers participated in received media attention, figure 7 demon-
strates that those stories that were written about collective action events consti-
tuted a diminishing share of media attention to the Panthers. Thus, as the Panthers 
became embedded into an ongoing narrative, dramatic events became less neces-
sary to attract media attention. This point is exemplified by continuing media 
attention, even up to the present, long after their organization dissolved (Rhodes 
2007).
Scope of Conflict
Media attention to the Panthers not only drew new recruits and donors to the 
organization. It also drew other actors into the fight, both as allies and as enemies 
of the Panthers. These included celebrities and other elites. These same actors 
then engaged with the media to bring about more news. Central to the expansion 
of the scope of conflict, and attendent media attention, was the role of state 
Figure 6. New York Times articles mentioning Panthers versus articles mentioning Panthers’ 
collective action events
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Note: The figure above shows the number of discrete events in the Collective Action Dataset 
that are associated with the Black Panthers, and the number of news articles in the New York 
Times that mention the Black Panthers. N = 3019 stories and 79 events.
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actors. In the New York Times, for instance, much attention is devoted to the 
formation and actions of a police organization, called the “Law Enforcement 
Group,” that was responsible for an attack by off-duty officers on Black Panthers 
outside a courtroom that left multiple Panthers injured, including one with a 
fractured skull (Bloom and Martin 2013, 158). The Los Angeles Times devoted 
considerable space to disputes between Panthers leader Eldridge Cleaver, who 
was doing a series of lectures at a Berkeley course on racial justice, and then-
governor Ronald Reagan, who opposed the course. While I cannot treat all of 
these events here, I analyze one of the manifestly most important events—the 
assassination of the leader of the Chicago BPP branch, Fred Hampton, on the 
orders of Illinois State Attorney Edward Hanrahan. While it is generally difficult, 
or perhaps even impossible, to establish whether police or Panthers initiated 
shootouts (Davenport 2010), the historical evidence is fairly clear that the Hamp-
ton killing was initiated by the police.
The assassination took place at 4 a.m. on December 4, 1969, as Hampton 
and other Panthers slept in his apartment. Heavy shooting occurred, and 
accounts of the event were immediately disputed by the Panthers and the Chi-
cago police. The next day, the Chicago press and the New York Times ran 
articles describing the shooting, giving preference to the version offered by 
 Chicago police wherein a drawn-out gun battle took place, in which Panthers 
Figure 7. Share of New York Times articles mentioning Black Panthers that feature Panthers’ 
collective action events
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fired first (Arlen 1973, 20). Panthers responded by giving tours of the apart-
ment where Hampton was killed and, as the local press saw the evidence for 
themselves, it became clear to them that nearly all the firing had been done by 
the police (Arlen 1973, 21–22; Bloom and Martin 2013, 238; Rhodes 2007, 
279). The next day, following local press coverage in Chicago, the New York 
Times ran a lengthy article suggesting foul play, followed with a long article 
detailing an autopsy report that suggested Hampton was killed in his sleep. The 
Times ran three articles during the following days, echoing calls for inquiries 
into the slaying. In light of this sympathetic coverage, Panthers chose to follow 
a media strategy, rather than violent retaliation, to exploit public sympathy for 
the Hampton killing (Haas 2010, 102). In response, the district attorney, 
Edward Hanrahan, pursued his own press strategy, releasing police photos of 
Hampton’s apartment with his own descriptions of the evidence printed below 
the photographs, giving an exclusive interview with the sympathetic Chicago 
Tribune, and even staging a television reenactment of the shooting with the 
police who had been involved (Arlen 1973, 23–26; Haas 2010, 104–5). Follow-
ing Hanrahan’s interview with the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Sun Times ran 
an article entitled “Bullet Holes Were Nail-Heads,” reporting that many of the 
bullet holes alleged by Hanrahan in the photos were in fact nailheads (Haas 
2010, 107). The New York Times echoed this story the next day. The New York 
Times ran a total of twenty-three articles in December related to the Hampton 
killing, and local coverage in Chicago was much more intense. When trials 
began for the surviving Panthers at Fred Hampton’s apartment, in response to 
the sympathetic press coverage, defense attorneys broke with standard practice 
to “tell the press what happened” as part of a novel strategy to exploit public 
goodwill. The district attorney, Hanrahan, was furious with what he called an 
attempt to “try their case in the press” (Haas 2010, 103), and another cycle of 
coverage ensued.
To summarize the Hampton assasination, although it was a highly newswor-
thy event, much of the attention to the event was due to the way in which it drew 
other actors into the conflict and how those actors sought media attention in 
response to one another’s media attention. Particularly in light of positive fram-
ings of the Panthers in more liberal news outlets, conservative news outlets gave 
a sympathetic outlet for Panthers’ opponents, mostly Edward Hanrahan. These 
framings, such as the “nailheads” photos, were then contested by outlets that 
were more sympathetic to the Panthers (or perhaps simply more committed to 
objective reporting). This cycle of contestation continued to fan attention to the 
Hampton assassination long after the event itself was over. Because this type of 
framing contest is central to the expansion of the scope of conflict, both postive 
and negative representations of an SMO are likely to result from, and feed into, 
positive feedback (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, 
1638, 1641).
As figure 8 (below) shows, attention to Hanrahan over this period becomes 
increasingly tied to the Panthers. Increasingly, when Hanrahan makes the news, 
he is mentioned alongside the Panthers. While this was in part due to the Panthers 
generating attention to Hanrahan, it is clear that Hanrahan was already a prom-
inent news story before becoming intertwined with the Panthers.
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Summary
The bias model fails to explain the rise of the Panthers to the media spotlight. 
Rather, the Panthers’ rise occurred through a set of interactive mechanisms, in 
which prior media attention was turned into future media attention. A dramatic 
new tactic of armed protest launched the Black Panthers into the national media 
spotlight, attracting more resources to the organization. These new resources in 
turn were leveraged for additional media attention. Throughout, increasing 
media attention went hand in hand with expansion of the scope of conflict and 
the Panthers becoming embedded in a news narrative.
The single case of the Black Panthers does not prove the theory of positive 
feedback. However, while the Panthers are a historically unique case, the struc-
ture and dynamics of their media attention are similar to many other cases. First, 
there are similar dynamics in the trajectories of other SMOs, with Students for a 
Democratic Society being the best documented (Gitlin 1980). Second, while the 
Panthers’ media attention would be an outlier in any linear model, they are not 
an outlier from the power-law distribution of media attention to SMOs; thus, the 
Panthers’ dominance of the media attention to the Black Power movement, while 
Figure 8. Attention to Edward Hanrahan and Black Panthers in the Chicago Tribune
800
600
400
Ch
i-T
rib
 A
rtic
les
200
0
1965
40
30
20
Pe
rce
nt
10
0
1965
1970 1975
Articles Mentioning Hanrahan
Articles Mentioning Hanrahan and Panthers
Year
Year
Percent of Hanrahan Articles Mentioning the Black Panthers
1980
1970 1975 1980
Note: The figure above displays the relationship between coverage of Edward Hanrahan and 
the Black Panthers in the Chicago Tribune. The first panel displays the number of articles that 
mention Hanrahan, and the number of articles that mention both Hanrahan and the Panthers. 
The second panel shows the percent of all Hanrahan articles that also mention the Panthers. 
The figure shows that Hanrahan’s coverage becomes increasingly tied to the Panthers up until 
1971, the year immediately following Fred Hampton’s assassination, after which it levels off at 
about 20 percent. The increasing over time in the second panel is statistically significant 
(p < .01). There are 3,432 articles mentioning Hanrahan and 635 articles mentioning both 
Hanrahan and the Panthers.
Cascades of Coverage  19
striking, is part of a general pattern of a handful of organizations capturing 
orders of magnitude more attention than typical organizations. Third, the mech-
anisms through which the positive feedback process for the Panthers occurred 
have been demonstrated in many other studies of SMOs and media attention.
Conclusions
“Bias models” of media attention argue, or assume implicitly, that characteristics 
of SMOs and their political environments are exogenous drivers of media atten-
tion. In this paper, I argued that media attention to some SMOs is best under-
stood as a dynamic process where SMO characteristics and their political 
environments are both causes and consequences of media attention. Through 
interactions between both SMOs and the media, as well as between media outlets 
and journalists themselves, media attention to SMOs can unfold as a positive 
feedback process where past attention encourages future attention. Consistent 
with formal models of positive feedback, I showed that the distribution of media 
attention across US SMOs was power-law distributed in national print and televi-
sion media. In a case study of the Black Panthers’ media cascade, one of the larg-
est and most dramatic in US history, I showed that media attention to the Panthers 
unfolded in a positive feedback process, through mechanisms identified in prior 
research.
The results support many central claims made by scholars of contentious pol-
itics and social theory: (1) timing and sequence matters, as Tilly puts it: “when 
things happen affect how they happen” (1984); (2) political action is under- 
determined (Sewell 1996); (3) politics are path dependent (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967, 53); (4) initial causes for the existence of an enduring social pattern may be 
different than the mechanisms that reproduce it (Stinchcombe 1968); (5) political 
change often occurs in dramatic punctuations, rather than gradual shifts 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009).
Path dependence suggests that the determinants of media attention differ over 
the course of an SMO’s career, and that media attention to SMOs and events may 
differ significantly. That is, while SMOs may become institutionalized in the news 
media through contentious events, they may continue to receive attention for 
reasons other than important events (Amenta et al. 2012; Gamson 2004). Studies 
that focus only on events may fail to capture all the political media attention to 
movements and movement actors, and mischaracterize their temporal dynamics.
The role of historical accidents in positive feedback processes suggests that at 
critical junctures historical change is, to some extent, “up for grabs,” allowing key 
individuals and events to have enduring impacts upon history. The Black Panther 
Party in 1966, for instance, was composed of a handful of militants with few 
resources, facing high levels of repression, and operating in obscurity in all but 
their local Bay Area. By 1970, however, they had become the organizational voice 
of Black Power. It is tempting to look at such a large effect as over-determined, as 
if it had to occur. Positive feedback suggests, however, that with small differences 
in history the fate of the BPP—and the Black Power movement as a whole—may 
have been quite  different.
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Notes
1. Cascades of attention go by many names, including “media storms,” “media hypes,” 
and “waves.” I refer to them as “cascades” throughout, since that is the most promi-
nent term in the literature.
2. More specifically, distributions with power-laws in the right tail.
3. Many analysts use logarithmic binning for log-log plots. These plots tend to be noisy 
in the tails and are potentially misleading (Newman 2005). I do not employ any bin-
ning procedure.
4. News outlets differ in the temporal patterns of attention to the Panthers (Davenport 
2010). Concerned about the national representativeness of the papers in figure 5, 
I compared their coverage to coverage in television and other print outlets. Records 
of television news are spotty before August 1968, when the Vanderbilt News Archive 
began systematically archiving newscasts. The best efforts to reconstruct them suggest 
that early coverage on television was similar to that of newspapers (Rhodes 2007, 
67–71 and 157). Tracking monthly coverage from August 1968 to 1977 shows that 
month-to-month correlations between the number of television newscasts on NBC, 
ABC, and CBS with the number of articles in the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, 
and Los Angeles Times were high, respectively: .75, .77, and .71. Comparing two 
Black papers, the New York Amsterdam News and the Chicago Defender, with main-
stream White newspapers in the same city, the New York Times and Chicago Tribune, 
respectively, the month-to-month article count correlations between the two pairs of 
papers are .78 for New York and .90 for Chicago. Although electronic versions of 
local Oakland papers are not available, work with these sources suggests that the 
Panthers received more attention in these sources than others (Davenport 2010; 
Rhodes 2007); therefore, the papers in my sample should be interpreted as represen-
tative only of the national news cascade.
5. The “Self-Defense” part of the name was later dropped. I use “Black Panthers,” “Pan-
thers,” and BPP interchangeably throughout.
6. Pronounced “fry” (Bloom and Martin 2013, 132).
7. Huey Newton estimates that he was pulled over 40–50 times in the early days of the 
BPP (Newton and Blake 2009, 129–30); none of these stops were reported in the 
national media in the days before the Panthers became a national story.
Supplementary Material
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